Today, President Putin faces a serious challenge: he must force the power structure that he has inherited to work. The regime which emerged under Yeltsin can be conditionally termed an "elective monarchy". It functions as a monarchy but requires democratic legitimization because all other forms of government - authoritarian, partisan, ideological, and inherited-monarchical - have been exhausted in Russia. This regime, though adaptable, is unable to implement consistent reforms and manage crises. It feeds the irresponsibility of both the political class and the society. All its resources and capabilities ultimately serve a single purpose - self-perpetuation of the ruling corporation. The optimal form of existence of such a power type is stagnation.

Back to a Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime?

Putin has attempted to regulate the elective monarchy, though not rejecting its main principle - democratically legitimized autocracy. The reforms implemented in 2000 were meant to form a "driving belt" mechanism, which would allow a transition to governing by way of subordination and unification of political life, within the Yeltsin model of power. In this manner, steps were taken to co-ordinate the relationships between the Center and the regions, enhance the Federation’s unitary nature, weaken the political role played by large businesses, increase the Federal Assembly’s loyalty to the President, neutralize the main centers of influence and pressure, and form a manageable multi-party system.

Concurrently, Vladimir Putin attempted to replace a number of the supporting elements of the Yeltsin regime. Thus, in trying to overcome reciprocal conspiracies, he began to introduce the principle of subordination. Those in power are now trying to rely not on the old shadow "network" of balances that includes various groups and clans, but rather on the central bureaucracy and power structures. Anti-Communism was rejected as a factor consolidating both the authorities and society. In fact, there was a stated intention to form a bureaucratic-authoritarian power regime within the framework of the elective monarchy.

A question arises: has Putin succeeded in his attempts to destroy the logic of the Yeltsin-style power structure or will he have to, even partially, return to the old rules of the game? The reformed elective monarchy has not been functioning long, but there is already the impression that the President has been unable to create a real "driving belt" mechanism. None of the cleansing and regulating "revolutions" initiated by the Center has been brought to its logical conclusion. The oligarchs have been intimidated, however, the problems of separating business from power and of developing uniform rules of the game for entrepreneurs (or of uniformly distancing entrepreneurs from power) have not been resolved. Regional elites have been quieted. Their influence on federal politics is now limited, but quasi-authoritarian regimes in the regions continue to exist. Opposition to the Center has been virtually liquidated, but given that there are no civilized channels for opposition to manifest itself, it may take on a destructive nature, external to the system.

It is clear why the creation of a "driving belt" mechanism has not been completed. It is not so much a matter of the difficulties in bringing together the diverse interests of the political classes and society to a single common denominator. Rather, it is the Center’s lack of vital instruments of power and, most importantly, the readiness to resort to force (or at least, up to this point) without which the system of vertical subordination cannot function. The threatening tactics used by the Center will only have a short-term effect and if used too frequently will only serve to demonstrate the impotence of those in power.

As a result, for the maintenance of stability, the Center is forced to return to "barter politics," making small concessions to disparate powers and influential groups in exchange for their loyalty to the federal powers. The right to stand for election for a third consecutive term obtained by a number of regional leaders, the favorable climate created offered to businessmen who are particularly close to the Kremlin, the mixed character of state symbols to satisfy all of the main political orientations, the selective approach to principle of the presumption of innocence, and the struggle with corruption - these are a few examples of the return to Yeltsin-style survival mechanisms. The internal heterogeneity of the ruling team that prevents it from formulating a uniform and clear developmental perspective is yet another indicator that the President is compelled to rely upon different, sometimes opposing interests. This, corresponds more with the Yeltsin’s ruling practices rather than the "driving belt" mechanism.

Thus, the present political regime is attempting to strengthen the administrative beginnings and vertical relations while at the same time maintaining the backbone of the Yeltsin structure. What are the prospects for this new political hybrid? Can it guarantee stability in Russia? Can one hope that it will stimulate a breakthrough for modernizing the country?

The New Political Hybrid’s Prospects

It seems that the current political regime, continuing to function within the framework of an elective monarchy, will recreate the same conflicts and limitations that caused the stagnation of Yeltsin’s power. These were, in the first place, three systemic-structural traps that manifested themselves during Yeltsin’s rule and that are already visible under the new leader. First, political measures undertaken by the Center to "gather power" or concentrate power levers in the same hands are strengthening not the government as a whole but rather only a part of it - the regime of governing. These measures cause the decay of the complex and distributed state infrastructure that encompasses the court system, self-government, parliamentarism, multi-party system, and various informal channels of society’s self-manifestation. Under such circumstances, any weakening of presidential power may lead to an even more significant weakening of the state.

Second, concentration of all power levers and controls in the hands of the President renders him responsible for the entire development process, including the failures that have been brought about by lower-level units of the apparatus. This may lead to a rapid de-legitimization of the Center. Furthermore, where distribution of responsibility is absent, all units of management inevitably become irresponsible. For example, during the fire at the Ostankinskaya Tower, without Putin’s command, nobody dared to shut down the electric supply. This is an illustration of how a pyramidal-style power mechanism functions. However, this is by no means the only example of the authorities’ formal omnipotence ultimately turning out to be practical impotence. History contains more than enough of these.

Third, if the political field is controlled by a single subject who is not dependent on society and is able to recreate himself, it becomes impossible to consolidate either power, or society. The leader who stands above the struggle can only exist in a non-consolidated space because only this kind of space requires an arbiter. Therefore, to justify his very existence, any leader within the monarchical framework will have to stimulate the occurrence of conflict in one way or another.

Inevitable consequences of "barter politics" already manifested themselves under Yeltsin’s rule. Then, the exchange of loyalty to the president for property and power resulted in the general degradation of the latter, causing the President to become a hostage to "court" groups. The current tactic of making small concessions in the name of preserving the leader and maintaining his high popularity ultimately satisfy nobody and will therefore, sooner or later, make evident the leader’s weakness and his lack of internal energy.

The Illusion of Success

The ruling team, unable to achieve the desired result and unwilling to admit its failures, is imitating already imitating action. The Center or various departments are more and more frequently pretending that they are establishing the rule of law, developing uniform rules of the game, gaining victory in Chechnya, and understanding the logic of current processes in general. Imitation is capable of capturing and creating an impression that the sought-after goal is easily achievable. An illusion of success is thus created - even if those holding power are inactive or unprofessional. However, such a transition to a virtual world may prove lethal to those in power simply because being detached from real societal processes may lead to losing control over events. To an obvious extent, it was the feigning of successes which caused the year 2000 to be a loss for economic reforms.

The Center’s aspiration to utilize the "driving belt" mechanism and at the same time continue to administer "barter politics" has quite naturally resulted in a conflict. The regime’s utilization of two incompatible management mechanisms leads, on the one hand, to a devaluation of the principle of subordination and, on the other hand, to a discrediting of the principle of agreement. Politicians or entrepreneurs, who the Center expect to be subordinate, have instead begun to bargain, hoping to strike a deal that will untie their hands. But even upon making a deal none of the parties is in a hurry to fulfil the conditions because the one who has got power on their side may at any moment resort to administrative resources.

The Center’s external pragmatism and repudiation of ideology only seem to facilitate society’s consolidation. In reality, they manifest themselves in a zigzag style of politics that reflects poor vision.

The fact that the President does not even try to assume any responsibilities has drawn much attention. Putin does not make promises, which is natural considering the logic of the current regime. A presidential monarchy, in principle, cannot have any responsibilities - they create the impression of weakness. The "vertical" of power has taken itself beyond all political forces and society, it does not depend on anybody. This is its method of survival. Therein lies the strength of Presidential power, but also its weakness. Without a system of mutual responsibilities it is difficult to preserve power in times of crisis.

What we seem to envision before us - is a self-sufficient ruling corporation, however, it is sooner an illusion than reality. It depends on its ability to manipulate public opinion and, if for some reason its devices fail to work, it may prove to be quite vulnerable. Putin depends on popularity ratings more than Yeltsin did - this was pointed out by Yuri Levada, Director of VTsIOM, having analyzed the foundations of the new regime. As a result, the current President may turn out to be even weaker and more of a populist than the former one; he may prove to have a smaller field for maneuvering when implementing necessary structural reforms. At any rate, an impression is being made that Putin’s actions are determined less by societal needs than by the necessity to maintain a high rating. This orients federal politics towards preserving the status quo rather than moving forward.

As paradoxical as it may be, the first Russian President had a more consolidated base of support at his disposal than Putin. Yeltsin used mobilized it with the assistance of anti-Communist ideas that proved to be a rather solid fastener. The part of society that supports Putin today is doing so, first of all, because of a sense of personal insecurity and desire for order. The problem, however, is that each of these groups understands order in its own way so that, at a critical moment, the differences in interpretations of this key term may turn out to be a dividing factor.

How Durable is the Model of Undistributed Power?

The retention of the President’s high popularity rating, (around 65 percent in December, 2000), can be explained, in the first place, by the lack of alternatives to Putin as a national leader. During the past year the hopes that were associated with his rule have radically weakened, and this should have disturbed Putin. At any rate, it is clear that support not cemented by public consensus with respect to basic values may turn out to be contextual and temporary. The idea of a strong and effective government cannot become the basis for such a consensus since it requires agreement within society with respect to ways of constructing such a government.

Moreover,, the weakening of all other institutions aside from presidential power compels the leader to rely on informal influence groups and leads to the development of new shadow centers of power, and thus to the rise of yet another "court" and favoritism. Simultaneously, the leader’s dependence on the apparatus becomes stronger. In a word, a situation well known from the time of Yeltsin’s rule is re-emerging. At that time, fearing the independence of institutions of power, Yeltsin transferred part of his responsibilities to his favorites. When that trust was exhausted, the President brought his family into ruling. Nepotism was the last stage in the degradation of power when the Russian political regime assumed conspicuous patrimonial features.

Putin’s attempts to rely on the Russian bureaucracy are doubtful and expedient. It has yet to go through that evolution that turned the Western "court servants" into a professional public or civil service, with codes of behavior and honor as well as the criteria of professionalism. Russian bureaucracy remains an element supporting the monarchy, with all the consequences this implies: susceptibility to corruption as a means of survival, gravitation towards shadow relationships, conservatism and fear of change, servility. Turning this type of bureaucracy into a regime’s foundation would render all hopes for modernization doomed.

The main conflict between democracy and the gravitation towards authoritarianism (which, under Yeltsin, tore the elective monarchy apart) still remains to be resolved. The current Center’s aspiration to totally control political process threatens to eventually fully discredit democracy and undermine the democratic legitimacy of power. The Kremlin will then be left with only one option: to resort to forceful means of survival, which are quite limited and ineffective. Thus, constructing power in the form of a "vertical," without any security on the part of other independent institutions ready to assume part of the responsibility for ruling and potential failures by the Center, renders this vertical as vulnerable as a house of cards. Under Yeltsin, the system of shadow balances and distribution of power, though it led to its degradation, at the same time also served as a cushion preventing against a collapse. The reliance on the subordination principle renders power more fragile due to the real threat of a sudden fracture in the "vertical."

All of the aforementioned leads to the following conclusion: even in its current reformed state, the elective monarchy is incapable of providing either stability or a reformist breakthrough, especially considering that there is no organized subject for the latter. The aspiration to regulate the monarchy, delimit the activities of other institutions and strengthen subordination, deprives the regime of its former safety net and increases the possibility for the evolution of extra-systemic and destructive forces. In a word, the degraded Yeltsin regime may turn out to be more stable than the current power, which is oriented towards a bureaucratic-authoritarian approach but has no means to support it.

The only way out of this dead-end is to reject the model of undistributed power, i.e., a transition to the construction of independent institutions that would allow the formation of an effective and responsible presidency. Only the development of such institutions can guarantee the efficiency of this office. As unfortunate as it is, however, so far the movement has been in the opposite direction. The only question that remains is what price society and those in power will have to pay for their faith in a monarchy that could not be overcome under Yeltsin.

Lilia Shevtsova is co-chair of the "Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions" project, along with Thomas Graham, Michael McFaul, Andreai Ryabov, and Leonid Smirnyagin. The project conducts research on Russia’s domestic politics, the evolution of political parties and governance institutions, shifts in the political mindset of the masses, and the problems of federal system evolution and the regional politics in Russia.