Vol. 4, Issue 04, April 2002 - Tatyana Maleva - Alternative Civilian Service in Russia: to Be or Not to Be?

It would seem that the legislator, after the first reading of the bill on alternative civilian service on April 17, 2002, replied affirmatively to the question posed in the title of this article when he swore loyalty to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which states: "A citizen of the Russian Federation, in the case that his convictions or his religion run counter to military service and in other cases, established by the federal law, has the right to replace the military service by an alternative civilian service" (Article 59) .

However, this question "to be or not to be" is in no way rhetorical.

Firstly, there are many articles in the Russian Constitution, which are only "protocols of intent," and not guides to action. A case in point is the constitutionally formalized provision that the Russian Federation is a "social state." However, this ambitious declaration is neither properly defined nor supported by implementation mechanisms. In this respect, there is nothing to keep the idea of alternative civilian service (hereafter referred to as ACS) from having to wait an indeterminate period for its hour to come.

Secondly, the tense background against which the passage of this law is being played out, and the continued existence of serious contradictions in how different relevant political forces view the key issues, are capable of sowing seeds of doubt as to the value of the bill now under consideration. This refers primarily to the demand that a person choosing ACS should provide proof of his convictions. Also, the term of ACS according to the proposed bill is set at 4 years-twice as long as military service.

And last but not least: the passage of the law does not necessarily mean that it will be workable. The absence of clear and well-thought-out rules for implementing any idea is capable only of discrediting it. This would merely create a new set of problems, which is exactly the situation we face with regard to the introduction of alternative civilian service.

Let us briefly examine the problem of ACS from various perspectives.

The Historical Perspective

The fact that the introduction of alternative civilian service in Russia is nothing new-more accurately, it is the restoration of an old Russian political tradition-is little known even to some of those taking part in the debate. Catherine II had already introduced exemption from military service on grounds of religious convictions in the 18th century, with regard to (for example) Menonite immigrants from Prussia who, in addition to common Protestant values, preached pacifism and the refusal to swear any kind of oath, including one of allegiance to the state. With time, these privileges were extended to the Dukhobors, Molokans, Evangelical Christians, Baptists, and members of certain other religious communities. The disciples of Leo Tolstoy also refused to perform military service. True, the reality of historical ACS in the Russian Empire was not entirely without incident. During the First World War, for example, after encountering massive manifestations of pacifism amongst the population, the authorities began to persecute those who refused to serve in the army.

Incidentally, the Bolsheviks also recognized the right to ACS with a special decree, On Exemption from Compulsory Military Service on the Grounds of Religious Convictions, issued on January 23, 1918. The institution of ACS continued to exist in the U.S.S.R. until 1939. Its abolition was motivated by the fact that, in the previous two years, not a single person had officially refused to serve in the army due to convictions. That same year, the law On Universal Military Conscription was adopted, which de jure abolished ACS in the U.S.S.R.

The taboo surrounding this topic was lifted at the end of the 1980s. In 1991, an article on the possibility of substituting military service for alternative civilian duties was incorporated into the Constitution, however, the concrete beginning of the debate on ACS can be dated as 1992, when work on the first bill on alternative civilian service in Russia began.

The tense and dramatic debate on ACS has continued for exactly ten years. It is sufficient to recall that once, in December 1994, the bill On Alternative Civilian Service was passed by the State Duma on its first reading, but voted down on the second. In 1998, the Duma once again shelved an updated draft, and finally removed the item from the agenda.

On April 17, 2002, the first hearing of a new bill, introduced by the Government, took place in the State Duma. The political clashes that preceded its introduction, however, give no guarantees that it will be passed.

The Sociological Perspective

Let us speak plainly: the debates regarding ACS are taking place against the backdrop of a sharp decline in the authority of military structures in the eyes of the public, a rise in political tension surrounding the armed forces, and the desire of a large segment of Russia’s youth to dodge military service, which they consider as not prestigious and fraught with danger. Thus, according to data from a recent VTsIOM (the Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research) survey, of 1,200 young men, only 12% expressed desire and readiness to be drafted into the army; 23% would agree to do so without particularly wanting to; 19% would submit to the draft with the utmost unwillingness; and 9% viewed the draft with fear, revulsion, and expectation of the very worst.

From the above, it is easy to understand the deep-seated, substantive conflict accompanying the passage of the law: civil society and other civilian organizations lobbying for the idea of ACS insist on religious and ideological motivations as the grounds for refusing to perform military service, while their opponents, personified by the military structures spokesmen, see ACS as a mechanism for evading the draft. The issue of ‘draft dodgers’ has long been a headache for the Ministry of Defense. They see a direct connection between the introduction of ACS and the nation's declining defense capability.

According to unofficial data (for example, those of the Union of Soldiers' Mothers' Committees), the number of ‘draft dodgers’ is at present 30,000-40,000. Other forecasts put the figure at 100,000, which (with an overall number of 340,000 draftees, according to the Ministry of Defense) appears unjustifiably high. At the same time, it is asserted that the overwhelming majority of these young men are ready to perform ACS. This is, however, difficult to believe.

First of all, the ideas of pacifism can hardly be deeply instilled in such a large number of young Russians. Most likely, this is a mass manifestation of mistrust toward the institution of military service, which is not at all the same thing.

Second, there is the well-known sociological phenomenon of a wide gulf between people's intentions and their concrete actions (a classic example of which is that the overwhelming majority of the non-indigenous population of Russia's Far North-as many as 70%-tell of their desire to leave the region, while no more than 10% actually take steps to do so). Support for the idea of ACS at the stage of public debate does not mean that, at the moment of real choice, these young people will actually undertake civilian service.

Third, one must not ignore the fact that parents see military service in a much darker light than the future draftees themselves. In the above-mentioned VTsIOM survey, for example, 9% of the young men and 28% of the parents viewed conscription with fear and revulsion. Thus, the Soldiers' Mothers clearly exaggerate the potential number of 'alternative servicemen' because they count many who are not in fact convinced pacifists, but the children of parents who are convinced of the dangers of military service.

In actual fact, young men of conscription age comprise several groups: those who intend to serve when called up; those who have deferments due to family hardships, education or other special circumstances; those who are exempt from the draft; the supporters of ACS on the grounds of genuine convictions; and 'draft dodgers.' It is most interesting that the latter are doing their best to dodge both military and civilian service. Another survey on the issues of ACS, conducted this time by the Youth Institute, testifies to this in particular (see the table 1).

It should come as no surprise that the attitudes of young people vary greatly, depending on their family status, parents' level of education, and, finally, place of residence. For rural youth and young men from the provinces, military service is not simply an obligation but a mechanism for integrating oneself into society, and even a means of vertical social mobility. They want to break out from the stagnating communities, and they see the army as an opportunity to master a profession, to learn about the outside world, and to acquire social skills and experience. For young men from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other large cities, military service is not only dangerous and low in prestige, but also delays one's access to education, and holds back one's professional and career growth. Thus, the proportion of young men in Moscow who would prefer military service is no more than 10%, while that of those who would like "alternative" service is 36%. The figure for those trying to avoid both is 40% (it is noteworthy that this last group is even larger in St. Petersburg-47%).

At least two conclusions may be drawn from this. The political conclusion is that it is senseless and unproductive to try to solve, on the basis of introducing ACS, two cardinally different problems: on the one hand, granting citizens with certain convictions the political freedom to choose; and, on the other hand, legalizing the intention of a large portion of young Russians to dodge military service. Another conclusion is that at present, none of the participants of the process has any kind of well-grounded idea of the scale of the future ACS, and cannot realistically determine the number of potential 'alternative servicemen.' This conclusion has a direct relationship with the economic aspect of the issue.

The Labor and Economic Perspective

Unlike the civil society organizations which are concerned about the issue of human rights and the military agencies that insist on maintaining the nation's defense capabilities, the Government's economic agencies are concerned about the costs of this issue. The economic perspective has essentially been on the sidelines of the unfolding debate, leaving a wide range of issues-the resolution of which will greatly affect the future of ACS in Russia-unanswered.

What is the labor market for those doing alternative service? What kinds of unskilled jobs can the Government offer them? How will their social utility be determined?

Today, the image of an 'alternative serviceman' in the mass, public consciousness is that of a janitor in a provincial hospital, doing heavy, low-prestige work which has no free supply within the labor market (or it is limited and does not meet the needs of the health care system). However, if alternative service assumes a truly mass character, this kind of job will not be enough. The list of ACS jobs might be expanded to include work at public institutions (children's shelters and homes, homes for the elderly and disabled, etc.), enterprises providing household and communal services; construction, maintenance, and repair; road construction; ecological clean-up and so on. Foreign practice suggests an even wider range of jobs, including firefighting and law enforcement services.

The other side of the issue concerns those who would be hiring those under the ACS program. What would the labor regulations be? How should their relations with employers and other agents of the labor market be regulated? How long should their workday be? Their free time? Finally, how much should these jobs pay? The new Labor Code that came into force in February 2000 was not designed to cover the specifics of labor relations within the framework of ACS. The lack of answers to these questions will nonplus both employers, employment agencies (which, most likely, will supervise ACS) and, in the final analysis, the very workers who chose this exotic (from the point of view of labor law) form of employment.

The third block of issues is connected with federal budget expenditures. This would depend on the principle of exterritoriality (the mandatory relocation of ACS servicemen), on which the military insisted in the process of drafting the law. If the issue of alternative employment within local labor markets is solved, thereby negating the need for exterritoriality, additional financial resources will not be required to relocate them to other regions, provide them with room and board, etc. If this principle of exterritoriality is accepted, significant costs will inevitably be incurred. According to preliminary estimates, federal budget outlays per one person in ACS would range from 9,000 to 74,000 rubles per year. It is likely that this exterritoriality would lead the federal budget into deficit. It is also apparent that this argument ought to play a decisive role in the debate over where ACS should be performed.

This argument, however, is not the only one. It is well known that, in Russia, neither the minimum wage nor the subsistence level pay provide a decent standard of living. Intra-family transfers are the main economic strategy for the majority of Russian households. An individual torn from his family unit (and his family's budget) finds himself in economic conditions cardinally different from those of any member of a household. In such conditions, the Government cannot avoid the additional expenses connected with maintaining a decent standard of living for alternative civilian servicemen, regardless of which particular form these expenses will take and by whom they will be borne (supplemental pay or social benefits; financing from the federal or local budget; etc.).

The solutions to these problems are not merely connected with concrete rules for implementing ACS. The answer not only to the key question "ACS: to be or not to be?," but to another-"What form will ACS take?"-depends on them as well. Will it be a heavy burden for the Government-one that provokes unwillingness among government agencies to support such a system, and even desire to block its introduction? Or will a new segment of the labor market be formed-one which would compensate for the deficiencies and shortages in manpower demanded for heavy, unskilled work? Finally, the main economic argument in favor of ACS is that the main difference between soldiers and those doing alternative service lies in their relationship vis-a-vis the nation's GDP. While expenditures on both categories are identical, alternative servicemen (unlike soldiers) participate in producing the GDP, which can, in particular, be used in boosting the nation's defense capability.

The Political Perspective (in Lieu of a Conclusion)

ACS has some fiery adherents. These include civil society organizations and certain religious communities, as well as large groups of young people. Despite the fact that they all voice their goals in terms of political freedoms, one must recognize that their interests and internal motivations do not always coincide. Some are concerned with the observance and development of constitutional rights and freedoms (including the right to profess any religion, and to hold and propagate non-mainstream convictions), while others are trying to spare the young generation from the dangers and stresses of military service.

At the same time, ACS also has serious opponents. These are, above all, the military structures and defense agencies. Their task is to prevent the number of men serving in the armed forces from being reduced.

Russian society's strategic goal is to strike a balance between the interests of these political forces. Society will lose if the law on ACS really does serve the interests of the 'draft dodgers,' and works against strengthening the young Russians' sense of responsibility and duty to their country. Society will lose if the idea of ACS fails to materialize. Society will win only if the introduction of ACS in Russia provides one more political freedom.

This is still, however, a long way off. Success depends largely on whether further debate can be diverted from the ideological channel to the realm of genuine solutions and practical regulations.

Tatyana Maleva is a co-chair (together with Anders Aslund) of the program "Post-Soviet Economies in Transition". The program focuses on the current economic situation in Russia and conducts research on socio-economic problems in the post-Soviet space, such as poverty, mortality, unemployment, and reform of the civil service .