This book, prepared as part of the Carnegie Moscow Center's series "Regions. Leaders. Parties," represents an attempt to draw a political profile of General Alexander Lebed-one of Russia's most visible politicians-and the Russian People Republican Party he heads, which is seen as having serious chances of clearing the five percent threshold needed to gain formal representation in the State Duma following the 1999 election. Both profiles, the individual's and the party's, are drawn against the background of the Krasnoyarsk Krai, a region currently attracting special attention from political analysts for at least three reasons: first, in the middle of 1998, the region experienced a highly publicized gubernatorial election, which brought General Lebed to power; second, the regional context makes it possible to form a better understanding of Lebed as a political leader, his team, strategy, and his behavior under different circumstances; and third, the recent series of elections and the overall political situation in the region are reflective of the political situation nationwide on the eve of parliamentary and presidential elections.

Inputs to the study include detailed data on the 1997-1998 regional election outcomes, numerous publications in Moscow-based and local press on Lebed's gubernatorial campaign and rule in the region, discussions with experts, the author's personal impressions of an October 1998 trip to the region, and a seminar held at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Due to its vast dimensions (one seventh of the Russia's total territory), geographical diversity, population structure with three fourths of the people living in urban areas, diversified economy with important stakes in raw materials export (Norilsky Nikel, Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter) and a depressed military and industrial sector, the Krasnoyarsk Krai may be seen as a microcosm of Russia. Many of the key social and economic indicators, such as industrial output dynamics, unemployment, per capita income, subsistence level etc. are at or close to average national levels. Electoral preferences of the Krai population are very similar to those of the population of Russia as a whole. The only thing that does not make it possible to see the Krai as Russia's perfect proxy is a higher share of protest voting, which is characteristic of many Northern and Eastern regions of the country. Nonetheless, a review of the current situation in the Krai helps us to develop a better understanding of many on-going processes and problems facing Russian society, and to draw conclusions as to the political future of Russian regions and the country as a whole.

Many analysts saw the Krasnoyarsk gubernatorial elections as a model of the upcoming presidential elections. There are good reasons for making comparisons between what happened in 1998 in the region and what Russia is likely to see in 2000. The common features include a similar political configuration with a rich and diversified political life, a legislature elected on a mixed basis prior to the gubernatorial elections, prominent Communists as the main opposition force, "Red Directors", powerful military-industrial and agrarian lobbies, relatively well developed mass media, and even the existence of local oligarchs. The fact that the Krasnoyarsk campaign, which was well-financed and made use of the latest election technologies and the best Russian professionals, was seen as a model of the future presidential race was highlighted by the personal involvement of this country's leading politicians commonly perceived as presidential hopefuls, including Lebed himself, Gennady Zyuganov, Yuri Luzhkov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

The Krasnoyarsk elections were the first elections carried out on the basis of a new election formula which lifted all restrictions on campaigning by candidates who are not indigenous to the region. The Krasnoyarsk elections were remarkable for a number of reasons, including the region's relative prosperity and the quite solid position of Governor Valery Zubov, who would have won the elections easily had Lebed opted out of the election campaign. Thus, the Krai should not be seen as a weak link for the party of power; rather, the voting elites in Krasnoyarsk never acted as a party of power there. The Krasnoyarsk incumbent's defeat was the defeat of the entire power elite, including the party of power and systemic opposition, rather that the defeat of the Kremlin.

In fact, the opposition may have been the biggest loser, because the opposition's candidate in the Krai-prominent industrialist Pyotr Romanov-had been seen as a potential candidate for Russian President shortly before the Krasnoyarsk elections. The Communist opposition had to face the fact that when the party of power is weakened it can lose the power struggle, but also that it is unable to put up a well-coordinated fight i.e. offer a single candidate, ensure concerted action by the federal and regional party leadership, or secure obedient voting by its "own" electorate (in the first round of elections the CPRF candidate received only 50% of what would normally be the communist electorate; in the second round, communists voters plainly ignored both Moscow and local party bosses and voted for Lebed). In other words, although the party of power lost the Krasnoyarsk campaign in terms of election returns, the left-wing opposition was utterly defeated - it lost the beginning of the fight, the fight itself, and the prize.

A new entrant to the Krai political set-up, Lebed may be viewed as a probe assessing the condition of the electoral field, and determining the winning tactics and strategy of an election campaign reflective of the current circumstances. A fundamentally new political configuration was generated by the Krasnoyarsk elections that has a direct relevance to the upcoming presidential campaign: the protest electorate, including that faction which walked out on the Liberal Democrats for the CPRF in 1995, increased in numbers and consolidated. Thus, the main opposition in the Krasnoyarsk elections was not "democrats" versus "communists", but the protest force versus both "democrats" and "communists". In a situation whereby the universal structure of electoral preferences may be broadly described as consisting of three factions roughly of a similar size, i.e. "democrats", "communists" and "protest", the balance of forces in an election campaign is precarious, and consolidation of any two out of the three factions can bring about a success.

The geographical factor proved to be an important contribution to both the campaigning and eventual victory. The dominant trend in the 1991 and 1996 presidential elections was that of a "progressive" capital city providing guidance to "backward" provinces. During gubernatorial elections, however, using the administrative resources at their disposal, incumbents fared better in more remote locations rather than in the regional capitals. In Krasnoyarsk, where the electoral opposition assumed a new, unusual dimension, and the electorate was split, what happened was exactly the opposite. Lebed used the proven model of actively canvassing voters in more remote locations, and, while losing the election in the regional capital, scored a landslide victory in rural areas and small towns.

The model of infrastructure support used by the winning party was also a fundamentally new one. A career army general, Lebed used the tactics of an air assault operation guided by signals from the drop zone. The Krasnoyarsk elections showed that powerful local party cells were not a prerequisite of victory: it is enough to have a small number of "anchors" and resources sufficient for rapid deployment. The elections also demonstrated that enthusiastic amateurs have no chances against a strong team of professionals.

The elections in a province that had been known for having a strong elite and serving as a traditional source of elite cadres for the Center, revealed a worrisome trend towards disruption of the "natural" mechanisms of regeneration of the elite, weaker consolidation of regional political elites, and the elites' being less capable of offering effective resistance to external pressures and the surfacing "outsiders". It became evident that in today's Russia, the role, consolidation, and basic instinct of self-preservation of the local elites were seriously undermined. Correspondingly, overall political sustainability was compromised.

The Lebed juggernaut signaled a transition to a new configuration of elites, one that is fundamentally different from the traditional arrangement: a transition from the perestroika-type opposition between the "new democratic" and the "old communist" elites to a post-perestroika model. A generational shift occurred within the elites at the same time: the old communist guard, both in ideology and economic affairs, only recently the main opponent of and threat to the current regime, is not playing that role any longer. A communist restoration has not happened and is unlikely to ever happen in the Krai.

The first several month of Lebed's tenure in a region as large as it is remote from Moscow were not too successful. Regional problems overwhelmed him, he failed to put together an efficient team, ruined the relations with the regional Legislative Assembly (Russia's first gubernatorial impeachment in May or June is a very real threat for him), quarreled with his allies, and had to call for the Kremlin's and Government's help following a series of resounding scandals. Similarly, Lebed was unable to put in place an independent financial base for the upcoming elections. What he did succeed in doing, though, was to rekindle (initially, at least) public interest in himself as an acting politician rather than a political has-been at home and create and solidify his image of a "Russian de Gaulle" in the West.

There is no immediate linkage between prospects of Lebed the governor and Lebed the presidential candidate. Indeed, Lebed's chances in the presidential elections are not necessarily dependent on how successfully he fares as Krasnoyarsk Governor - his current position is unlikely to become either a spring board or a stumbling block for him. The factors which are at work include the time factor (the shorter is the time remaining before the presidential elections, the less Lebed can be held responsible as Governor), and the factor of a lack of public trust in mass media.

Time works for Lebed. First, the chances that Lebed may be stuck in Krasnoyarsk, or lose his popularity, or prove unable to run a province (to say nothing of a country), are very slim now. The crisis absolved Lebed of his economic failures, past and future. Second, as the crisis deepens nationwide, the chances of politicians representing the elite in power, including Luzhkov and Zyuganov, gradually weaken, while Lebed emerges as an increasingly popular politician of national significance, untarnished by being in power, and a potential strongman, an image in which Lebed remains unrivaled.

As a rule, elections are a combination of the choice made by voters and the one made by the elite that provides guidance to or influences the electorate in various ways or, at the extreme, simply supplants the electorate's choice with its own. The respective shares of the elite's and voters' choices vary from region to region, and from campaign to campaign. The past few years have seen the growing role of elites in Russian elections. Although 1998 Krasnoyarsk election won by Lebed was a "voters'" election with the role of the elite being modest due to both regional particularities and fragmentation and weakening of the elite itself, in most other regions the situation is notably different and normally in favor of the elites.

A charismatic candidate with a populist election strategy, canvassing the protest vote and almost completely unable to play up to the elite, Lebed is best suited to a "voters'" election. He has almost no chances of being elected by elites. Thus, Lebed's success or failure in the upcoming presidential campaign depends not on his personality per se but rather on the extent to which those elections will be "elite's" or "voters'" elections. If the elites remain in control, Lebed's chances will be extremely slim, unless somebody agrees to accept him as a junior partner, as was the case in 1996. If the elites fully or partially lose control over the elections, however, then Lebed's chances will still not be great, since in that case there is a strong possibility that there will hardly be elections at all, and instead a dictatorship will take the place of Russia's frail electoral democracy. As for dictators, be they military or police, they would normally seize power by themselves instead of relying on charismatic provincial leaders. Thus, Lebed's window of opportunity is very narrow: on the one hand, fragmentation and low morale among the elites would not secure his victory; on the other hand, for Lebed to win he needs for the elites to still keep some of their positions and to once again try their luck in an open and relatively fair election.

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This book, intended for political scientists, regional development analysts and general public interested in political development issues in Russia and its regions, represents the most complete and detailed analysis of social and economic development in the Krasnoyarsk Krai in 1998 prior to, during, and after the second gubernatorial elections. It is also supported by a large amount of factual materials: the book is illustrated with original maps and figures and attachments include a detailed chronology of the region's political life during the election period and Lebed's early months in power, a number of tables providing reference information on regional election outcomes over the past ten years, and a narrative of Lebed's gubernatorial election campaign provided by I. Oleynik, a staff analyst at the Lebed headquarters.