Medvedev Supports Major Cuts in Strategic Offensive Weapons

“President Medvedev has expressed support for far-reaching cutbacks in strategic offensive weapons,” said Alexei Arbatov, member of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Expert Council, commenting on the president’s recent statement. “And this is very good. But his calculations have surprised many experts. If we cut back delivery vehicles by ‘several fold,’ as he has said, then how many will that leave for each side? Russia currently has fewer than 1,000, while the U.S. has a little more than that. If their numbers were to be cut in half, then there would be less than 500; a cut by two thirds would put the numbers at under 300. At the same time, it has been agreed that the new warhead levels will be lower than that established in the 2002 Moscow Treaty (1,700-2,200). This implies a reduction to 1,500-1,600 warheads. To deploy them all on 300 delivery vehicles would weaken the balance of power, inasmuch as such a concentration could hypothetically provoke the other side into a first strike. After all, if a launcher and missile carrying 5-6 or more warheads can be destroyed in a precision strike using a single nuclear warhead, then the ‘trade-off’ of assets launched versus destroyed will favor the attacker. At present, there is an average of 3 warheads on each delivery vehicle. This is the essence of the strategic theory and the concept of stability that Moscow and Washington had agreed upon as far back as 1990 when they signed the declaration on strategic stability, which states that as the numbers of strategic offensive weapons are reduced, the sides would put more emphasis on the less vulnerable systems (such as mobile land- and sea-based missiles; incidentally, the Topol and Topol-M mobile missiles are ideal systems of this kind) and would reduce the number of warheads on delivery vehicles in order to decrease the possibility and probability of a first strike.

It could, of course, be argued that these concepts and calculations have become outdated with the end of the Cold War and the partnerial relationship existing between the two countries, but this would contradict the second part of president Medvedev’s statement: an agreement needs to be reached on American anti-ballistic missile defense plans, which implies that America must back away from its plans to create a third deployment site in Eastern Europe. Russia’s position on this issue is based on the stability concept set forth in the 1972 ABM Treaty, namely, that a national ABM system would have a destabilizing effect, since a country having such a system would be able to launch a preventive strike against an enemy’s strategic forces and be able to defend itself from a counterstrike by the weakened enemy. Considering Russian concern over the 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic (as well as the possible further expansion of the system), no advance reduction of strategic offensive arms delivery vehicles that would make it more advantageous to carry out a first strike and raise the importance of ABM bases as a defense against a counterstrike can be proposed, as it would undermine the principle of mutual nuclear deterrence.

As is often the case (Belarus, WTO membership, the base in Manas), Russian official top-level policy statements do not always add up. The question needs to be seriously considered whether the mechanism of policy development and preparation of official statements on the most important issues is functioning normally, or even whether a clear and precise mechanism is in place at all. Complex issues such as strategic arms require all the formulas to be carefully dosed and weighed with a pharmacist’s precision; even changing the order of individual words can change the entire meaning. This leaves absolutely no room for improvisation or carelessness. Pronouncements by a head of state are an instrument of national policy, and every word (and even the pauses) must be of significance in ensuring national and international security.”