Andrew Kuchins

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The recent sharp dispute over the Ukrainian presidential elections vividly illustrated the fragile and shallow nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Highly touted in both Washington and Moscow as a “strategic partnership” in 2001, the relationship has drifted and the gap between glowing rhetoric and thin substance has grown. When major policy differences emerge, as over war in Iraq in 2002-2003 and recently over Ukraine, all too easily the U.S.-Russian relationship spirals into “crisis,” and the threat of a “new Cold War” looms.

This sense of drift and the impression that U.S.-Russian relations were heavier on rhetoric than substance motivated the authors in the summer of 2004 to try to develop a common strategic vision about why this relationship matters a great deal now, why it will matter in the future and how to ensure that its potential can be fulfilled. We seek to present how Russia and the United States understand their broader interests in international relations, to what extent their goals and interests overlap and how in the coming years we may be able to increase that overlap. As Russians and Americans, we should view relations with the other party in terms of national needs. The U.S. does matter a lot to Russia’s development, and Russia matters quite a bit to the functioning of the global order. That is in itself a good basis for an upgrade.

The driving factors now and in the foreseeable future that will promote closer U.S. and Russian interests will be mainly in the security and energy realms. Within the realm of security issues, we broadly share interests in combating terrorism and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But despite a rhetorical shared common interest of peace and stability across Eurasia, our competing visions and goals in the former Soviet states, as the recent presidential elections in Ukraine displayed, prevent deep cooperation. Moscow’s status as an energy superpower possessing the largest overall hydrocarbon (oil and natural gas) reserves in the world is increasingly significant for U.S. policy and commercial interests.

The United States and Russia cannot afford to find themselves on the path of collision, while collusion remains out of the question. The answer then is patience, coupled with practical steps; consultations and transparency about policies; clarity about the "red lines"; and compromise where core interests are not at stake. We need to concentrate on what’s realistically doable now and in the foreseeable future. Each country makes a choice on the basis of prioritizing its various interests. When interests are compelling enough, such cooperation should not be held hostage, for example, to the pace of Russia’s domestic evolution or the United States’ making its foreign policy more multilateral. To the extent that we can successfully cooperate on more issues, trust will grow, and our perceptions of our interests and how they are in effect tied to values may grow closer as well.

Read the report here in English or Russian.

U.S.-Russian relations are in a period of change. There is clearly an opportunity to build a new relationship, one based on today’s realities rather than on yesterday’s expectations. To stimulate this process of rebuilding and revision, the Russian and Eurasian Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has prepared An Agenda for Renewal. The report sets out an innovative agenda for the renewal of the U.S.-Russian relationship, based on policies that capitalize on areas of mutual interest and affirm the long-term vision of a Russia integrated into Western economic, political, and security structures.

An Agenda for Renewal covers core security issues, problems in Russia’s southern periphery, and ways to promote the country’s long-term democratic and economic transformation. The contributors to the report include: Anders Aslund, Thomas Carothers, Thomas Graham, Stephen Holmes, Andrew Kuchins, Anatol Lieven, Michael McFaul, Martha Brill Olcott, and Jon Wolfsthal.